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Philosophers have been contemplating the nature of the mind for centuries 
and have produced mountains of intricate jargon, thought experiments, and 
views, that map a landscape of interminable disputes.  One such dispute is 1
between philosophers who believe that the mind can be explained as a 
mechanism and philosophers who insist it cannot. In this paper I take a look 
at this dispute and argue that it is unique in philosophy and a key to the 
nature of the mind. 
 
Q(core): Can the mind be explained as a mechanism? 
 
And one ought to wonder: 
 
Q(meta): Why do some people believe that the mind can be explained as a 
mechanism and others insist it cannot? 
 
One might argue like René Descartes (1637) that there is no point in 
philosophy which is not disputed — and that there are many reasons why 
philosophers might answer Q(core) one way or the other. 
 
The mind is a motherlode of problems and concepts over which people can 
argue indefinitely — free will, genuine creativity, love and emotions, the self 
and the problem of identity and more. 
 
And we use some of these concepts without agreement on a definition, 
because they are incoherent or because, as Wittgenstein argues in 
Philosophical Investigations​ (PI, §77), their boundaries are blurred. 
 
Imagine a poet who says that the mind cannot be a mechanism because a 
mechanism cannot love, or a philosopher who argues that the mind cannot 
be a mechanism because a mechanism cannot have libertarian free will.  
1 ​The abundance of views and intricate terminology in philosophy of mind reminds me of a 
scene in Monty Python’s Life of Brian, in which Brian meets the People’s Front of Judea for 
the first time: “Brian: Excuse me. Are you the Judean People's Front? Reg: Fuck off! We're 
the People's Front of Judea” — ​https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a0BpfwazhUA 
  
Philosophers are generally not in agreement even on central concepts in 
philosophy of mind, such as physicalism (Chomsky, 2009), consciousness, 
and qualia. 
 
People may be biased toward a religious belief or a scientific worldview — 
like a religious person who dogmatically insists that a mechanism cannot 
have a soul, or a scientist who insists on ignoring anything that cannot be 
measured. 
 
There are many such reasons but I believe that it is just the circumstance 
that enabled a fascinating phenomenon to remain hidden in plain view for 
so long. 
 
Wittgenstein says “Look at the blue of the sky and say to yourself, ‘How 
blue the sky is!’ — When you do it spontaneously — without philosophical 
purposes — the idea never crosses your mind that this impression of colour 
belongs only to you. And you have no qualms about exclaiming thus to 
another. And if you point at anything as you say the words, it is at the sky. I 
mean: you don’t have the pointing-into-yourself feeling that often 
accompanies ‘naming sensations’ when one is thinking about the ‘private 
language’. Nor do you think that really you ought to point at the colour not 
with your hand, but with your attention.” (PI, §275) 
  
Right, but when I look at the blue of the sky, I am often aware of its private 
aspect, and I point at it, so to speak, with my attention, and I note it is utterly 
mysterious and cannot possibly be the product of a mechanism. 
 
Q(blue): As you stare at a blue thing, do you see anything in your mind that 
may not be explained in mechanical terms? 
 
The thing I am speaking of is sometimes called qualia, which philosophers 
roughly define as “what it is like” to see the blue of the sky or “the way 
things seem to us”. But these definitions are problematic because they may 
be taken to be said about cognitive processes that may be conceivably 
explained mechanically, such as associations, judgements, memory, and so 
on.  
 
 And this is a problem that will come back again and again to bite us — that 
people may be using the ​same words​ to talk about ​different things​. 
 
One might say that seeing the blue of the sky is like jumping into a beautiful 
abyss, or that the blue of the sky seems different today. 
 
But the thing I am speaking of does not seem like anything at all, and there 
is nothing it is like.  
 
Wittgenstein says “It’s not a Something, but not a Nothing either! The 
conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the same service as a 
Something about which nothing could be said.” (PI, §304)  2
 
Wittgenstein argues that we have no criteria of identity or correctness for it 
(PI, §253 - §279) and that it transcends the psychological self (§398). 
However, much of Wittgenstein’s criticism applies to introspection of 
cognitive processes as well, and scientists may argue that one day they 
may have better access to such processes than introspection affords.  
 
One would like to say that qualia are about the quality rather than quantity 
of a perception ​— that they designate that which cannot be described.  
 
But, we can imagine someone who says that the color of the sky has a blue 
quality to it, because he is not in a position to quantify the color through 
introspection, though he could have been in principle — like a violin player 
with absolute pitch who can identify a note, or an omnipotent wine expert 
who can consistently describe the bouquet of a wine with detailed, fantastic 
associations, while you can only report that it seems indescribably nice. 
 
And that is the curse of a Something about which nothing can be said, for 
whatever you say about it may be taken to be said about something else. 
 
And yet some people insist that even in simply looking at the blue of the 
sky, they find a mysterious and non-mechanical not-a-Nothing. 
2 ​This reminds me of how Osho describes meditation: “It is very difficult to verbalize it. To 
say something about meditation is a contradiction in terms. It is something which you can 
have, which you can be, but by its very nature you cannot say what it is.” Incidentally, he 
argues that people have come to use the word meditation to talk about something entirely 
different, akin to an activity involving concentration or contemplation. 
  
Daniel Dennett (1993, pp. 82-85), who believes that the mind may be 
explained as a mechanism, compares such people to tribesmen who 
believe in a blue-eyed god of the forest. In an interview at the Moscow 
Center for Consciousness Studies (2012), Vadim Vasilyev asks him “How 
do you conceive this extra consciousness which actually doesn’t exist, but 
which can be conceived?” and Dennett answers “I think that a lot of people, 
they might not admit it but I think, when they think of consciousness in this 
extra sense, they imagine a sort of radioactive glow.” 
 
Someone could say “I can see in my mind the thing of which you speak, but 
I owe you no explanation for a Something about which nothing can be said.” 
 
But Dennett (1993, p. 372) flatly denies the existence of the thing I am 
speaking of, and my view, put bluntly, is that we should take him at his word 
— but other philosophers disagree. 
 
When Dennett (1979) writes “My view, put bluntly, is that there is no 
phenomenological manifold in any such relation to our reports. There are 
the public reports we issue, and then there are the episodes of our 
propositional awareness, our judgments, and then there is — so far as 
introspection is concerned — darkness.”  David Chalmers (1997a, p. 190) 3
resolves it as a linguistic dispute: “What might be going on when someone 
claims that introspection reveals only judgments? Perhaps Dennett is a 
zombie. Perhaps he means something unusual by ‘judgment.’ Most likely, 
however, he has taken something else for introspection: what we might call 
extrospection, the process of observing one's own cognitive mechanisms 
‘from the outside,’ as it were, and reflecting on what is going on.”  
 
But if we consider the entire edifice of arguments philosophers erect to 
support their views, we are likely to find arguments we dispute or concepts 
we use differently. Then we may argue that we disagree because of these 
misunderstandings which we are not likely to resolve. 
 
3 ​In case you are left wondering what Dennett means by “any such relation”, then it has 
something to do with “episodes [that] are the momentary, wordless thinkings or convictions 
(sometimes misleadingly called conscious or episodic beliefs) that are often supposed to 
be the executive bridges leading to our public, worded introspective reports from our 
perusal or enjoyment of the phenomenological manifold our reports are about.” — good 
luck making sense out of that. 
 My intention in focusing the question on an introspective staring at a blue 
thing is to isolate the discussion as much as possible from these theoretical 
edifices, blurred concepts, and cognitive capacities, within the 
circumference of the problem. 
 
Naturally, as we stare at a blue thing our mental activity does not stop, and 
we might wander off on a stream of thought and end up manifesting all of 
these capacities. Nevertheless, we may say that Q(blue) is concerned with 
an empty-minded visual meditation, even if it only manifests in the form of 
an occasional moment of grace.  
 
Presumably, during such a moment we would still have an experience of 
color — at least some people insist that such is the case. 
 
Dennett (2003) and other philosophers and scientists argue that 
introspection is a poor source of evidence and that we can be 
embarrassingly mistaken about our inner world — consider for example 
change blindness, which occurs when an observer fails to notice significant 
changes introduced into a visual scene. 
 
If someone metaphorically pointed his finger at qualia and reported “look, 
there it is”, we would presumably have to inform him that his finger is a bag 
of tricks that cannot be used properly as a pointing device. The unlucky 
subject would then protest in vain that qualia would still be there even if it 
turned out that his finger was really a banana.  4
 
Despite the curtains of cognitive illusions, it is in introspection where one 
might find qualia if they exists at all to be found, not in philosophy books or 
columns of numbers. 
 
In an interview at the Moscow Center for Consciousness Studies (2013), 
Dmitry Volkov asks Chalmers why most philosophers are physicalists, and 
Chalmers answers that “the progress of science has led many to think that 
the world must be physicalistic” and that “although many people think that 
physicalism has problems, the alternatives also have serious problems.” 
 
4 ​Bruce Lee explains it to a young kung fu student in the movie Enter the Dragon: “It’s like a 
finger pointing away to the moon. Don’t concentrate on the finger or you will miss all that 
heavenly glory.” — ​https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CwPWDMvT21E 
 John Searle (1997, p. xiii) writes that philosophers have an urge for 
reductionism and materialism because they suppose that otherwise they 
will somehow reject the scientific worldview.  
 
Dennett (1993, p. 37) appears to confirm this explanation when he writes: 
“This fundamentally antiscientific stance of dualism is, to my mind, its most 
disqualifying feature and is the reason why in this book I adopt the 
apparently dogmatic rule that dualism is to be avoided at all costs.”  
 
But one may still wonder why Dennett can be so dogmatic about the 
scientific worldview in the first place. 
 
Consider this conversation between Einstein and Rudolf Carnap, as 
reported by Carnap (1963): “Once Einstein said that the problem of the Now 
worried him seriously. He explained that the experience of the Now means 
something special for man, something essentially different from the past 
and the future, but that this important difference does not and cannot occur 
within physics. That this experience cannot be grasped by science seemed 
to him a matter of painful but inevitable resignation. I remarked that all that 
occurs objectively can be described in science; on the one hand the 
temporal sequence of events is described in physics; and, on the other 
hand, the peculiarities of man's experiences with respect to time, including 
his different attitude towards past, present, and future, can be described 
and (in principle) explained in psychology. But Einstein thought that these 
scientific descriptions cannot possibly satisfy our human needs; that there is 
something essential about the Now which is just outside the realm of 
science. We both agreed that this was not a question of a defect for which 
science could be blamed, as Bergson thought. I did not wish to press the 
point, because I wanted primarily to understand his personal attitude to the 
problem rather than to clarify the theoretical situation. But I definitely had 
the impression that Einstein's thinking on this point involved a lack of 
distinction between experience and knowledge. Since science in principle 
can say all that can be said, there is no unanswerable question left. But 
though there is no theoretical question left, there is still the common human 
emotional experience, which is sometimes disturbing for special 
psychological reasons.” 
 
It is not clear if Carnap is struggling to understand Einstein, or simply 
believes that one need not explain a Something about which nothing can be 
 said. But it seems reasonable to interpret Einstein as speaking of the 
problem at hand, and if that is the case, then one may wonder why Dennett 
insists on being more Catholic than the Pope about science. 
 
Could Dennett’s scientific dogmatism be a symptom rather than a cause? 
 
We can make Q(core) more recognizable by expressing it in terms of 
computation rather than mechanisms, for we can easily imagine the body of 
an intelligent robot driven by a system of cogwheels, but not so its brain — 
for that, we might think, it needs a computer. 
 
One way to think about the nature of the mind is the Computational Theory 
of Mind, according to which, the mind is a form of computation, as we 
understand computation since Alan Turing — as a mechanical process 
(Horst, 2015). This theory enables us to finally express the core 
disagreement in terms of a simple and familiar problem. 
 
Imagine that scientists have built a computing system that perfectly 
emulates a human brain. Imagine that we take it outside and ask it to stare 
at the blue sky, and ask yourself the following question: 
 
Q(ai): As you stare at a blue thing, do you see anything in your mind that 
you would expect to be missing in principle from a computer that stares at a 
blue thing?  
 
Philosophers and scientists have answered this question in the past. 
Dennett (1993, p. 281) declares in his book ​Consciousness Explained​ that 
computation may be conscious in the fullest sense, and Marvin Minsky, who 
won the Turing award in 1969 and co-founded the MIT artificial intelligence 
laboratory, makes the same claim in a ​Closer to Truth​ interview with Robert 
Lawrence Kuhn (2011). On the other side of the trench you can find Searle, 
armed with a shotgun  and the firm belief that computation cannot amount 5
to a mind, and the physicist Roger Penrose who believes that the mind is 
incomputable. 
 
5 Searle defending his views with a shotgun in his hands: 
http://www.newphilosopher.com/articles/john-searle-it-upsets-me-when-i-read-the-nonsens
e-written-by-my-contemporaries/ 
 
 But the sight of philosophers eternally arguing about such questions is as 
ordinary as the sight of an apple falling to the ground, and so it was largely 
ignored. No one in philosophy of mind is seriously bothered by Q(meta). 
 
Computation is a marvelous tree — its roots are planted in the mechanical 
and its leaves reach the doors of perception. 
 
René Descartes, the mathematician, scientist, and philosopher of the 17th 
century, often credited as the father of modern philosophy, believed that all 
material bodies operate on mechanical principles (Hatfield, 2014). But 
despite his wish to explain the world as a mechanism, Descartes, arguably 
the philosopher most identified with dualism, believed that a mechanism is 
insufficient for a mind, and in 1637 he argues in the ​Discourse on Method 
that mechanical machines “could never use words, or put together signs, as 
we do in order to declare our thoughts to others.” (Oppy, 2011).  
 
Since Newton we have abandoned the hope of attaining an intelligible 
mechanical explanation of the world (Chomsky, 2009). Our current 
conception of the physical is what Leibniz would call “occult and 
unintelligible” (Janiak, 2014).  It includes fields that permeate empty space, 6
relativity of simultaneity, entanglement, the wave-particle duality, and the 
measurement problem, just to begin with — and if that is true of sunlight or 
an apple falling to the ground, what hope is there for the mind?  
 
Three hundred years after the ​Discourse​, Alan Turing (1936) invents the 
Universal Turing Machine, a simple and abstract mechanical machine that 
according to the Church-Turing thesis can carry out any effective 
computation. Then, in ​Computing Machinery and Intelligence​, Turing (1950) 
considers the question “Can machines think?” and proposes to replace it 
with an imitation game, which came to be known as the Turing Test, and in 
which an interrogator is required to determine if a hidden interlocutor is man 
or machine. Turing essentially argues that Descartes was wrong, and that 
computers may one day respond appropriately and meaningfully to 
whatever is said in their presence — that a machine reducible to a 
mechanism could pass the imitation game for a thinking thing. Would that 
thing amount to a mind?  
6 ​The physicist Richard Feynman famously said: “I think I can safely say that nobody 
understands quantum mechanics.” “Do not keep saying to yourself, if you can possibly 
avoid it, 'But how can it be like that?... Nobody knows how it can be like that.” 
  
Turing does not give a decisive answer to that question. He writes: “In 
considering the functions of the mind or the brain we find certain operations 
which we can explain in purely mechanical terms. This we say does not 
correspond to the real mind: it is a sort of skin which we must strip off if we 
are to find the real mind. But then in what remains we find a further skin to 
be stripped off, and so on. Proceeding in this way do we ever come to the 
‘real’ mind, or do we eventually come to the skin which has nothing in it? In 
the latter case the whole mind is mechanical.” 
 
Computers cannot yet pass the imitation game, but researchers are making 
continuous progress in artificial intelligence. Sixty-six years after Turing’s 
paper, you can ask Google such questions as “When was the Discourse on 
Method written?” by voice, and get an appropriate and meaningful answer; 
computers can use words to describe images as we do (Karpathy, 2015)  7
and learn to play video games, uncannily well (Wired, 2015). 
 
We are gradually coming to accept it as natural whenever computation is 
applied successfully to problems that belong naturally in the domain of 
human cognition. The belief that a computer may never pass the Turing test 
starts to look like a case of a shrinking God-of-the-gaps. 
 
It is possible that Descartes underestimated the capacity of mechanisms, 
but was that key to his belief in dualism? Had he known then what we know 
today of computers, would he have repented and joined the Order of 
Computational Theory of Mind, or would he have remained adamant? 
 
A generation after Descartes, Leibniz (1714; 1898) writes the beautiful mill 
argument: “Suppose that there be a machine, the structure of which 
produces thinking, feeling, and perceiving; imagine this machine enlarged 
but preserving the same proportions, so that you could enter it as if it were 
a mill. This being supposed, you might visit its inside; but what would you 
observe there? Nothing but parts which push and move each other, and 
never anything that could explain perception.” Is Leibniz simply 
underestimating the capacity of mechanisms too? 
 
7 ​http://cs.stanford.edu/people/karpathy/deepimagesent/ 
 Leibniz’s mill argument captures the essence of that which David Chalmers 
(1995) calls the hard problem of consciousness — that there appears to be 
a Something in our minds that is inexplicable on mechanical grounds. Many 
proponents of the Computational Theory of Mind deny the hard problem of 
consciousness. 
 
A common argument by people who appeal to a physical version of the 
Church-Turing thesis, is roughly that the universe is computable and 
therefore a computer may in principle simulate a brain as a physical 
system. On what grounds, they ask, may we deny that such a simulation 
harbors a mind? 
 
The funny xkcd comic strip ​A Bunch of Rocks​,  takes this idea to its 8
extreme depicting our universe as a computation that a Sisyphus-like 
protagonist carries out by systematically moving rocks on an infinite stretch 
of sand on which he is stuck for eternity. Since one can emulate a Turing 
machine by moving rocks, it is possible in principle to carry out any effective 
computation this way.  
 
Philosophers sometimes criticize such arguments as ​ploys of funny 
instantiation​ (Maudlin) or ​intuition pumps​ (Dennett), complaining that they 
unfairly engage our intuitions, but I am actually interested in that intuitive 
response. 
 
Surprisingly, plenty of people with whom I have spoken calmly insist that a 
bunch of rocks may be just as conscious as they are, if the rocks are moved 
around properly. 
 
Some argue that while the mind may be explained as computation, it is 
nevertheless a computation that may not be adequately carried out by a 
Turing Machine — because the human brain is massively parallel, or 
analog, or interactive, and so on, while a Turing machine is serial, and 
discrete, and is meant to compute an output and halt. Therefore, to simulate 
what the brain does as a computing system, we would supposedly need a 
special architecture — for example, a massively parallel architecture, or 
some other yet-unheard-of architecture. 
 
8 ​https://xkcd.com/505/ 
 Indeed, the brain does not resemble a Turing machine, and one may claim 
that another computation model may represent better what the brain does 
as a computing system, but ultimately a Turing machine can simulate any 
computing system to arbitrary accuracy. 
 
Others argue that a simulation of a thing is not the real thing. Searle (1984, 
p. 37) writes: “no one supposes that a computer simulation of a storm will 
leave us all wet”, to which Eliezer Yudkowsky (2010) responds by asking: 
“Can you have simulated information that is not really information? Can you 
have correct answers which are only simulated correct answers?”  
 
There are ongoing disputes about what counts as an implementation of a 
computation, whether computation is observer-relative or not, and about the 
role played by causation in a computation that is being carried out — but we 
can sidestep these problems, since I do not mind granting computational 
functionalists a good part of what they want — an infinity of computations 
that are practically indistinguishable from brains in passing for a human. 
 
There is one more source of confusion we need to consider — naive 
realism, which is roughly the belief that the blue of the sky is a property of 
the sky. People may believe that because it is a commonsense naive belief, 
or because they have taken this position after philosophical consideration.  
 
It is no wonder that if someone believes that the blue of the sky is not a 
thing to be explained in one’s mind, the problem would “go away”. But naive 
realism is generally rejected by philosophers (BonJour, 2007).  
 
It seems rather that the world we experience around us — the world we 
inhabit, with its colors, smells, and sounds, is the product of our brains. It is 
caused by external reality but it is not external reality itself, not directly. The 
neuroscientist Rodolfo Llinás expressed it colorfully by saying that “Life is 
nothing but a dream guided by the senses” (Revonsuo, 1995), and this is 
what Dennett (1993, p. 372) means when he writes “it really does seem as 
if science has shown us that the colors can't be out there, and hence must 
be in here.” 
 
One powerful illustration of this idea is Benham’s Top — a spinning disk 
with black and white stripes that creates the sensation of color. Where is 
the color? is it in the mind or in the external world? 
  
But the point is not to convince anyone or to win an argument — it is rather 
to find people whose answers to Q(ai) create a crisis — people who agree 
on most everything except for a single intuition which drives their 
disagreement. Let’s call such people ‘peers on Q(ai)’. 
 
If someone insists on naive realism, or denies that computation is a 
mechanical process, or believes that computers may never show initiative 
“just because”, then I would not know what to make of his answer to Q(ai). 
 
We can see that simple as Q(blue) and Q(ai) seem to be, they nevertheless 
require some familiarity with philosophy and computer science, and 
therefore, contrary to standard practice in experimental philosophy, it may 
not be useful to present them to random people. 
 
However,  once all is said and done the questions are simple, and although 
I employ “intuition pumps” to shake people off computational functionalism, 
the answer I almost always get is a remarkable and resolute No — the mind 
is a mechanism, there would be nothing missing in principle from a 
computer running the right computation. 
 
I believe that human-level general artificial intelligence may be possible and 
that computers may one day reliably pass the Turing test, but nevertheless, 
I find something in my mind that cannot be explained away as computation. 
In my mind that thing is as evident as a sun burning in the middle of a clear 
blue sky, and therefore I find the general response quite amazing. 
 
I have informally talked in person with about twenty technically informed 
people who appeared to be my peers on Q(ai). Almost all of them insisted 
that they see nothing in their mind which would seem to lie beyond the 
reach of computation.  Some of these people are friends with whom I have 9
discussed this subject many times over the years, and yet, I was not able to 
make them see that sun burning in the middle of the sky. 
 
9 There were three exceptions. One person was sympathetic to Chalmers’s nonreductive 
functionalism, another was undecided, and one reported seeing the problem after several 
years of conversations in parallel with becoming religious. 
 This general response is supposedly contrary to conventional wisdom, 
according to which most people find functional accounts of the mind 
counterintuitive (Chalmers, 1997b; Dennett, 1993, p. 226). 
 
But Q(core) is buried under so much confusion that it renders conventional 
wisdom practically meaningless. There are plenty of “wrong” reasons to 
reject materialism and the Computational Theory of Mind. 
 
In fact, it appears to me that most philosophically informed people embrace 
the idea that the mind is a form of computation.  Consider the following 10
opinion of famous scholars and scientists, some of whom have shown 
lifelong interest in the problem of consciousness.  
 
Richard Dawkins says in an interview (Humphrey, 1986): “Could you ever 
build a machine that was conscious? I know that I'm conscious, I know that 
I'm a machine, therefore it seems to me — and I know there's nothing 
special — I mean, perhaps I could say I have faith, but I think, I almost 
know that there's nothing in my brain that couldn't in principle be simulated 
in a computer, so if you took the extreme policy of building a computer that 
was an exact simulation of a human brain, doing everything that a human 
brain does, point for point, mapping from human brain anatomy to computer 
hardware, then of course such a machine would have to be conscious in 
just the same sense as I know that I'm conscious.”  
 
In a recent dialog the physicist Lawrence Krauss asks Noam Chomsky 
(2015) if he believes that the mind is in principle computable and could be 
emulated on other substrates like silicon. Chomsky, who is known as a 
mysterian, nevertheless answers that the mind is organized matter and that 
“we don't know of any physical reason to believe that the particular 
components of that organized matter are critical for its operation”, “therefore 
it could be emulated presumably in some other substances.” Krauss agrees 
and says “We are a computing machine of some sort.” “It's hard to imagine 
that if we were able to reproduce all the information we wouldn't get the 
same person.” Chomsky then goes on to dismiss Chalmers’s Hard 
Problem. 
 
10 Your best chance to find a dualist is in a philosophy department. 
 Google’s director of engineering and futurist Ray Kurzweil (2012) writes: “a 
computer that is successfully emulating the complexity of a human brain 
would also have the same emergent consciousness as a human.”  
 
The physicist David Deutsch (2004), known for the Church-Turing-Deutsch 
principle and for his contribution to quantum computing, writes: “there is 
every reason to believe that the brain is a universal classical computer.” 
 
The physicist Stephen Hawking (2010) writes: “I think the brain is 
essentially a computer and consciousness is like a computer program.” 
“Theoretically, it could be re-created on a neural network”. 
 
In contrast, I have a forceful intuition that the mysterious Something that I 
find in my mind cannot be produced by a mechanism. I call it an intuition 
because it is a “clear seeming” that cannot be justified or reasoned, and it is 
forceful because I can no more  dismiss it than any of Euclid’s axioms.  
 
I believe that it is the intuition that drives some people to Chalmers’s 
formulation of the Hard Problem of Consciousness, and I shall therefore call 
it the Hard Intuition of Consciousness. 
 
I have come to believe that most people do not have that intuition — they 
seem to be blind to a most evident thing — and when they do point at an 
intuition, they often seem to point at the wrong kind.  
 
Stanislas Dehaene (2014), who believes that the mind may be explained as 
computation argues that “the hard problem just seems hard because it 
engages ill-defined intuitions. Once our intuition is educated by cognitive 
neuroscience and computer simulations, Chalmers’s hard problem will 
evaporate.” 
 
We have many intuitions, and while philosophers employ intuitions in their 
reasoning, they know that intuitions can be illusory, in that they may 
generate false beliefs. 
 
There are studies in experimental philosophy (Sytsma 2010) that suggest 
people are more inclined to intuitively attribute seeing color to a robot than 
feeling pain. We can easily imagine that such intuitive judgements may be 
influenced by naive realism, by the way the words ​seeing ​and ​feeling pain 
 are used in everyday language, and by the way robots have been depicted 
in science fiction over the years, and we can imagine these intuitive 
judgements may change in the future. 
 
The sliding block puzzle Huarong Dao may initially invoke the intuition that it 
is impossible to solve. Similarly, people may intuitively believe that the mind 
is too complex to be simulated in principle by a computer, and we can 
imagine that familiarity with computation may dissolve that intuition. 
 
I have an intuition that I have free will; however, I am quite aware that I 
cannot intelligibly reconcile it with determinism or indeterminism, and after 
philosophical consideration I concede that it may be an illusion.  
 
Why? Because I am not conscious of the origin of my thoughts and 
decisions. It is as if I have an intuition about a thing that happens behind a 
closed door — an intuition about something that I cannot observe. 
 
But the Hard Intuition is different — it is about a mysterious, indescribable 
thing which seems to be in plain view, and the closer I look, the more 
veridical that intuition seems to be. 
 
In a way, it is like being able to see God and knowing that one cannot 
explain it as a combination of cogwheels.  
 
It is similar in force to a geometric intuition and no amount of contemplation 
will dissolve it. It is up there with my intuitions of existence and time. 
 
My intuition that something exists generates my most certain belief. 
Philosophers may complain that Descartes’s ​cogito​ is logically suspect or 
defective but it would not make the slightest difference. It is a finger that 
points at truth. 
 
My intuition of time is forceful as well. There seems to be a Now and there 
seems to be continuous change. I am aware that this intuition is 
unintelligible, but I cannot explain it away. 
 
If someone were to insist that nothing really exists or that nothing ever 
changes, I would have to tell him “good luck with that.” 
 
 Someone could argue that the Hard Intuition is the result of a catastrophic 
defect in my thinking — I know from experience that in my dreams I may fall 
in love with a gorgeous woman and never notice that she literally has the 
face of a goldfish, or carefully study a triangle and conclude that it has four 
edges;  and I know from experience that even in my waking life I can make 11
incredible errors of judgment. But the Hard Intuition is a most persistent 
seeming that never falters, and I suspect that the force of the ​cogito​ and my 
intuition of time flows from it. 
 
Dennett (2001) writes: “There is a powerful and ubiquitous intuition that 
computational, mechanistic models of consciousness, of the sort we 
naturalists favor, must leave something out — something important. Just 
what must they leave out? The critics have found that it’s hard to say, 
exactly: qualia, feelings, emotions, the what-it’s-likeness (Nagel) or the 
ontological subjectivity (Searle) of consciousness.”  
 
Does Dennett see the problem after all or does he merely present the 
position of his colleagues? 
 
Dennett points out their difficulty in saying what is left out — a point that has 
been the source of endless debates and confusion, for it is impossible to 
say what is left out. In addition, I believe that the Hard Intuition is not 
ubiquitous at all. 
 
He goes on to define philosophical zombies as beings that are “behaviorally 
indistinguishable from a normal human being but utterly lacking in 
consciousness”, and he expresses the intuition as “the conviction that there 
is a real difference between a conscious person and a perfect zombie — 
let’s call that intuition the Zombic Hunch — leading [some philosophers] to 
the thesis of Zombism: that the fundamental flaw in any mechanistic theory 
of consciousness is that it cannot account for this important difference.” He 
11 ​Richard Feynman comically recounts how he came to abandon his practice of Lucid 
Dreaming for similar reasons: “I'm dreaming one night as usual, making observations, and I 
see on the wall in front of me a pennant. I answer for the twenty-fifth time, ‘Yes, I'm 
dreaming in color,’ and then I realize that I've been sleeping with the back of my head 
against a brass rod. I put my hand behind my head and I feel that the back of my head is 
soft. I think, ‘Aha! That's why I've been able to make all these observations in my dreams: 
the brass rod has disturbed my visual cortex. All I have to do is sleep with a brass rod 
under my head, and I can make these observations any time I want. So I think I'll stop 
making observations on this one, and go into deeper sleep.’ When I woke up later, there 
was no brass rod, nor was the back of my head soft.” 
 concludes: “A hundred years from now, I expect this claim will be scarcely 
credible, but let the record show that in 1999, John Searle, David Chalmers, 
Colin McGinn, Joseph Levine and many other philosophers of mind don’t 
just feel the tug of the Zombic Hunch (I can feel the tug as well as 
anybody), they credit it.” 
 
Dennett’s view becomes clear if we imagine his zombies as future 
intelligent computing systems. Other philosophers define philosophical 
zombies as physically identical to humans (Kirk, 2015) but in that form 
zombies become irrelevant unless one presupposes that reality in general 
and brains in particular are computable, and that is an open question. 
 
David Deutsch (2004) writes: “The most straightforward such idea, and also 
the most extreme, is that the whole of what we usually think of as reality is 
merely a program running on a gigantic computer – a Great Simulator.” but 
he rules it out since “It is in the very nature of computational universality 
that if we and our world were composed of software, we should have no 
means of understanding the real physics – the physics underlying the 
hardware of the Great Simulator itself.” 
 
Ultimate reality cannot be a computation since computation, as we 
understand the concept, requires a computer and that entails an infinite 
regress. 
 
But what if we restrict ourselves to observable phenomena? The physicist 
Seth Lloyd (2013) writes that “all observed phenomena are consistent with 
the model in which the universe is a quantum computer”. But even if that is 
true, and leaving aside what some people, including Einstein, claim about 
the human mind, we cannot rule out the possibility that such phenomena 
will be discovered or are already in plain view. 
 
In ​The Character of Physical Law​, the physicist Richard Feynman (1967, p. 
33) says: “[The law of gravity] is not exact; Einstein had to modify it, and we 
know it is not quite right yet, because we have still to put the quantum 
theory in. That is the same with all our other laws — they are not exact. 
There is always an edge of mystery, always a place where we have some 
fiddling around to do yet. This may or may not be a property of Nature, but it 
certainly is common to all the laws as we know them today.”  
 
 Later, in ​Simulating Physics with Computers​, Feynman (1982) notes: “A 
very interesting question is the origin of the probabilities in quantum 
mechanics.” 
 
Consider a pair of entangled photons. According to Einstein (1935) one of 
the particles may be used to predict with certainty the value of a physical 
quantity of the other particle. But according to physics, the only way to 
compute such a prediction would be to use the first particle as a black box 
or a Turing Oracle. 
 
Scientists and philosophers have proposed various explanations for this 
phenomenon including superdeterminism, superluminal particles, 
many-worlds, and more recently wormholes that connect entangled 
particles (Jensen, 2013). But another interpretation remains — that it is an 
observable incomputable phenomenon. 
 
The Hard Intuition compels me to believe that the mysterious not-a-Nothing 
in my mind is not mechanical. 
 
Evolution compels me to believe that it is not epiphenomenal — it is causal 
even if I cannot conceive how. 
 
That, in turn, compels me to believe that my ability to observe and report it, 
is a case of causality rather than a convoluted case of epiphenomenalism.  
 
And that compels me to believe that there is no mechanical explanation of 
my behavior and that brains are not reducible to computing systems. 
 
Back to Dennett (2001) — while discussing Leibniz’s mill, he appears to 
frame his own Zombic Hunch in terms of complexity by asking “Might it be 
that somehow the organization of all the parts which work one upon another 
yields consciousness as an emergent product?” “We have learned how to 
think fluently and reliably about the cumulative effects of intricate cascades 
of micromechanisms, trillions upon trillions of events of billions of types, 
interacting on dozens of levels. Can we harness these new powers of 
disciplined imagination to the task of climbing out of Leibniz’s mill?” And he 
concludes: “We are quite certain that a naturalistic, mechanistic explanation 
of consciousness is not just possible; it is fast becoming actual.” 
 
 The last man on earth sat alone in a room. There was a knock on the 
door…  First, it filled his heart with hope, but then he remembered — every 12
evening as the temperatures dropped, a crooked spring in the door’s 
internal mechanism snapped and triggered a cascade of clicks. 
 
Then he put a record on the gramophone, and as the sound of violin turned 
his room into heaven, he tried to eat the music with a spoon. 
 
Metaphorically, philosophers and scientists like Dennett and Dehaene try to 
explain the mechanism of locked doors, but to some people, they make as 
much sense as the lonely man dancing around with his spoon. 
 
“The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of 
their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something — 
because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real foundations of their 
inquiry do not strike people at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck 
them. — And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most 
striking and most powerful.” (Wittgenstein, PI, §129) 
 
The 2500-year-old Hindu Upanishads tell of a mysterious internal reality 
that most people do not see — it is called ‘Atman’, usually translated into 
English as the ​Self​ with a capital ​S​ to distinguish it from the psychological 
self. The Upanishads identify Atman with another concept called ‘Brahman’ 
that stands for the nature of ultimate reality. 
 
“The Self is the ear of the ear, mind of the mind, speech of speech. He is 
also the breath of the breath, and eye of the eye.” (Kena Upanishad) 
 
“To many it is not given to hear of the Self. Many, though they hear of it, do 
not understand it.” (Katha Upanishad) 
 
“Subtler than the subtlest is this Self, and beyond all logic.” (Katha 
Upanishad) 
 
“The Self is not known through study of the scriptures, nor through subtlety 
of the intellect, nor through much learning. But by him who longs for him is 
he known.” (Katha Upanishad) 
12 These two famous lines first appeared in Fredric Brown’s short story ‘Knock’, published 
in 1949. 
  
“This Brahman, this Self, deep-hidden in all beings, is not revealed to all; 
but to the seers, pure in heart, concentrated in mind — to them is he 
revealed.” (Katha Upanishad) 
 
“He truly knows Brahman who knows him as beyond knowledge; he who 
thinks that he knows, knows not. The ignorant think that Brahman is known, 
but the wise know him to be beyond knowledge.” (Kena Upanishad) 
 
“Soundless, formless, intangible, undying, tasteless, odorless, without 
beginning, without end, eternal, immutable, beyond nature, is the Self.” 
(Katha Upanishad) 
 
“The Self-Existent made the senses turn outward. Accordingly, man looks 
toward what is without, and sees not what is within. Rare is he who, longing 
for immortality, shuts his eyes to what is without and beholds the Self.” 
(Katha Upanishad) 
 
“He through whom man sees, tastes, smells, hears, feels, and enjoys, is the 
omniscient Lord.” (Katha Upanishad) 
 
“In one’s own soul Brahman is realized clearly, as if seen in a mirror.” 
(Katha Upanishad) 
  
Ironically, Dennett is not far off the mark when he compares dualists to 
tribesmen who believe in a blue-eyed god of the forest. The Bhagavad Gita 
narrates the dialogue between Prince Arjuna and his charioteer, who 
reveals himself as Lord Krishna, the blue-colored Hindu Deity representing 
Atman, the Self, and Brahman, the ultimate nature of reality. 
 
“The glory of the Self is beheld by a few, and a few describe it; a few listen, 
but many without understanding.” (§1.29) 
 
“My true being is unborn and changeless. I am the Lord who dwells in every 
creature.” (§4.6) 
 
“Few see through the veil of maya. The world, deluded, does not know that 
I am without birth and changeless.” (§7.25) 
 
 “When you make your mind one-pointed through regular practice of 
meditation, you will find the supreme glory of the Lord.” (Gita §8.8) 
 
“The immature do not look beyond physical appearances to see my true 
nature as the Lord of all creation.”  (§9.11) 
 
“I am the goal of life, the Lord and support of all, the inner witness, the 
abode of all.”  (§9.18) 
 
I am not a religious person but nevertheless I find it fascinating that the 
ancient Upanishads and the Gita, as reflected in these quotes from the 
translations by Prabhavananda (1975) and Easwaran (2007), describe my 
experience better than contemporary Western philosophers. 
 
The Atman transcends logic, reason, and knowledge. It is a Something 
about which nothing can be said, and as such it is described apophatically, 
by way of denial and religious superlatives. And since it cannot be 
described, it cannot be ascribed any change and it is therefore said to be 
immutable and eternal. Finally, it is identified with the ultimate nature of 
reality, which may remind one of panpsychism or idealism. 
 
The Atman is described in some quotes as an inner witness, the eye of the 
eye, and the thing through which one sees, which are descriptions that 
many people can relate to. Yet, the Upanishads and the Gita insist that few 
people behold that mysterious inner reality. How can that be? 
 
Philosophers of mind look at each other with a good measure of disbelief. It 
sometimes seems as if deep in their hearts, dualists believe that Dennett 
knows he is wrong, and that he advocates his ideas as some kind of 
intellectual game designed to annoy them. But the peer response with 
which I have met suggests the possibility that Dennett really does not see 
the problem dualists contemplate. 
 
Functionalists are off the mark too. For decades they have been trying to 
explain how mechanical processes ought to amount to full consciousness, 
but they have failed to explain how it is that their colleagues stubbornly fail 
to see what anyone with a decent capacity to reason can easily see. 
 
 There is a fascinating problem of other minds expressed by Q(meta). 
Dualists have been afraid to address it because they cannot conceive of 
consciousness without that mysterious ingredient, and they dare not 
seriously argue that other people are not really conscious. 
 
But that is a false and unwarranted conclusion. To conceive of people who 
deny the Hard Intuition as philosophical zombies is as ridiculous as 
conceiving of the not-a-Nothing, which some people report, as a sort of 
radioactive glow. And the Hindu scriptures express the problem in terms of 
an introspective skill that anyone may in principle realize. 
 
In my own case, I first came to realize that there is something unmechanical 
about my mind after several years of meditation. David Chalmers, too, 
recounts starting off as a materialist and gradually turning to mind-body 
dualism (Chalmers, 1997a, pp. xiv, 357). 
 
According to Einstein there is something essential about the Now which is 
just outside the realm of science, and according to Wittgenstein, it is a 
Something about which nothing can be said, but Q(meta) itself is a question 
that may and should be investigated philosophically and scientifically. 
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